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1 Introduction
There has always been an international dimension to debates on intellectual property
rights (IPR); with the integration of the world economy, however, IPR debates have be-
come global. The United States, the European Union, Japan, and other developed coun-
tries have actively pushed to impose “Western-style” IPR legislation worldwide. Contrary
to the Paris and Berne Conventions, which allowed considerable flexibility in their appli-
cation, the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
imposes a common framework to all World Trade Organization (WTO) members as re-
gards IPR.1 To date, this is the most important international agreement on the design
of intellectual property regimes. And it is also the most controversial, having been chal-
lenged by many countries, including Korea, Brazil, Thailand, India and the Caribbean
states. As a result of these tensions the enforcement of IPR legislation varies consider-
ably around the world. The present paper proposes a simple theoretical framework in
which developing countries’ incentive to enforce IPR can be analyzed. The desirabil-
ity of enforcing IPR equally, everywhere, including in developing countries, can also be
assessed.
One source of conflict between developed and developing/emerging countries regarding
the TRIPS agreement is that strong IPR limit the possibility of technological learning
through imitation, something which has been a key factor in the development of countries
such as the US (in the 19th century), Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea (in the 20th century),
and more recently China and India (see Sachs, 2003).2 Having copied technology invented
by others, these countries have become major innovators: today the top three countries
in term of R&D expenditure are the US, China, and Japan.3 It is thus not clear that
international agreements such as TRIPS will lead to more innovation at the global level.
The costs and benefits of universal enforcement of IPR need to be more thoroughly
analyzed.
We study the impact of different IPR regimes (no protection; partial protection where
only the rich country enforces IPR; and full protection) on the investment decisions made
by private firms in a two-countries –developing and developed– model. We focus on in-
cremental innovation: innovation enhances the quality of a vertically differentiated com-
1The TRIPS agreement, negotiated through the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, is administered by the
World Trade Organization and applies to all WTO members.
2A second source of conflict concerns medical drugs. In 2001 this led to a round of talks resulting in the
Doha Declaration, the aim of which is to ensure easier access to medicines by all. This declaration, which
made a significant dent in the TRIPS agreement, has been challenged by the US and other developed
countries with the help of lobbies such as PhRMA (representing pharmaceutical companies in the US).
3See WIPO Publication No. 941E/2011 ISBN 978-92-805-2152-8 at www.wipo.int.
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modity. This corresponds, for instance, to a new generation of mobile/smart phones,
or an improvement of an existing drug. Indeed, many new products are incremental im-
provements on existing ones (Acemoglu et al., 2016).4 For instance in the pharmaceutical
industry, “on average, only about one-third of new-drug applications submitted to the
FDA are for new molecular entities. Most of the rest are either for reformulations or
incremental modifications of existing drugs...” (see Congressional Budget Office, 2006 pp
15-16). The cost of the R&D investment depends on the efficiency of the R&D process,
which by convention is higher in the advanced economy. By contrast, we assume that
imitation is costless. However, it yields a potential indirect cost: a firm that violates IPR
cannot legally export the imitated good to a country that enforces them.
If a WTO member is found guilty of violating its IPR obligations, the complaining
government obtains the right to impose trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs.
There have hence been more than 30 TRIPS-relates disputes since the enactment of the
agreement. In many cases the simple threat of sanctions was enough for the parties to
find a solution.5 In other cases sanctions were implemented.6 In the US, Section 301 and
Special 301 of the Trade Act include retaliatory trade sanction against countries violating
US intellectual property rights. Harris (2008) mentions several countries targeted by this
mechanism in Latin-American (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) and in Asia (China,
India, South Korea and Thailand).
Even in the absence of trade sanctions, advanced economies monitor their importa-
tions to block out goods suspected of infringing intellectual property right. The European
Union has enacted a new regulation concerning customs enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights, which came into force on 1 January 2014 (see IP/11/630 and MEMO/11/327).
This regulation introduced a decisive change to the procedure for destroying suspicious
goods: Such goods can now be destroyed by customs control without the need to ini-
tiate a legal proceeding to determine the existence of an infringement of intellectual
property rights. In the United States, Customs and Borders Protection similarly targets
and seizes imports of counterfeit and pirated goods, and enforces exclusion orders on
patent-infringing goods.
Consistently with these national and international legislations and practices, in the
model below IPR protection shields the domestic firm from the competition of patent
4Acemoglu et al. (2016) study innovation networks. They focus on the cumulative process of innova-
tion in a wide variety of sectors, as it constitutes the bulk of R&D. By contrast genuine break through
or drastic innovations are rather rare.
5See Fink (2004) for a discussion and https://www.wto.org for the more recent disputes.
6For instance, the European Community suspended Generalized System of Preferences benefits for
Korean products in 1987 as a response to Korean violations of IPR (see Zˇigic´, 2000).
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infringing foreign competitor. There are thus benefits for a firm originating from a country
which enforces IPR in competing with a firm originating from a country that does not
enforce them: IPR act as a barrier to its competitor entering into its market, and it can
copy its competitor’s innovations, if any. If the developing country chooses to protect
IPR to be able to export then the patented products are imperfect substitutes and the
domestic and the foreign firms are competing a` la Cournot in both markets. The analysis
has two steps.
First we establish that the link between protection of IPR and investment in R&D
is non-monotonic: full protection of IPR is not always conducive of a higher level of
investment than a partial regime. This result arises because, when technological transfer
occurs through imitation, innovation by one firm expands the demand of both firms so
that the competitor has more incentive to invest in R&D. Technically the R&D investment
of the two competing firms are strategic complements under a partial protection regime
of IPR and there are strategic substitutes under a full protection regime. Our model
then predicts that stricter IPR decreases genuine innovation by the local firm in the
developing country, while increasing innovation by the firm in the developed country,
without necessarily increasing innovation at the global level. This result is consistent
with the empirical literature on pharmaceutical (see Chaudhuri et al., 2006, Qian, 2007,
Kyle and McGahan, 2012, Williams, 2013).
Second, we establish that the incentives to protect IPR in a developing country are de-
creasing in the relative size of its domestic market compared to its foreign market. When
the size of its national market is large compared to its foreign market, the developing
country can afford not to protect IPR to free-ride on advanced economies technologies,
even if this precludes some of its firms from legally exporting to rich countries (e.g.,
generic drugs produced without licence in India). The paper thus predicts that small
developing countries should be willing to enforce IPR, since IPR protection enhances
export opportunities, while large ones should be more reluctant to do so, as illustrated
by the recurrent disputes between the US and China, or the US and Brazil. In other
words, our model predicts that the willingness to enforce IPR should be U-shaped in
the relative size of a country’s internal market with respect to its export opportunities.
This theoretical result is consistent with existing empirical evidences. Empirically there
is a robust U-shaped relation between IPR enforcement and economic development (see
Braga et al., 2000, Chen and Puttitanun, 2005 and Auriol et al., 2017).
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2 Related literature
The standard economic rationale for patents is to encourage inventors to incur R&D costs
by protecting them from imitators. Starting with the seminal work by Nordhaus (1969), a
vast literature in Industrial Organization focus on optimal patent design, notably length
and breadth, in the context of a closed economy. Moschini and Langinier (2002), Gallini
and Scotchmer (2002), Scotchmer (2004) and Hall (2007) provide nice reviews of this
literature. In a nutshell IPR are necessary to stimulate invention and new technologies
but must be limited in time and scope as they increase the cost of patented commodities
and slow down the diffusion of knowledge.
The issue of IPR adoption in an open economy has first been addressed in the trade
literature (see for instance, Lai and Qiu, 2003 and Grossman and Lai, 2004). The main
focus of this trade literature is the impact of IPR infringement on horizontal innovation
(i.e., the creation of a new variety) in two countries -one rich, one poor- models of mo-
nopolistic competition. There are three main findings that emerge from this literature.
First, there is a conflict of interest between the North (which generally gains from stricter
enforcement in the South) and the South (which generally loses). Second, a stricter en-
forcement of IPR in the South has generally a positive impact on innovation. Third, the
level of IPR protection increases monotonically with the level of economic development.7
The third finding is at odds with the results of the empirical literature.
In empirical work, Braga et al. (2000) and Chen and Puttitanun (2005) have identified
a U-shape relationship between patent protection and economic development as measured
by GDP per capita. To guide their analysis, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) propose a two-
sectors (import and domestic) model where the level of innovation in the rich country is
fixed and firms in the poor country do not export. For some values of the parameters
the level of protection first decreases and then increases when the per capita GDP of the
country increases. Auriol et al. (2017) confirms this U-shape result and shows that it is
robust to the introduction of population size (i.e., total GDP). The discrepancy between
this robust U-shape relation and the prediction of a monotone relationship between IPR
strength and economic development, shows the necessity of further work on this topic.
The trade literature focuses on non-cumulative innovation (i.e., horizontal innova-
tion, typically a new product variety). In this literature, IPR protection guarantees the
monopolistic competition profit, while in the absence of protection a competitive fringe
7This literature assumes that the North is both the main innovator and the main market so that
when the share of total demand in the South increases (i.e., when it becomes richer), its temptation to
free-ride is reduced because of its adverse effect on the North’s innovation, hence the monotonicity result.
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drives profits to zero. There is therefore no strategic interaction in the innovation choices
of the firms: either the variable monopolistic competition profit is larger than the sunk
cost of creating a new variety, and a firm does it, or it is not and nothing happens. In
this paper we add a strategic dimension to R&D choices, by considering that in each
innovative sector/variety (there is a continuum of them), there are two competing firms,
one in the North and one in the South, selling imperfect substitutes. In a first stage the
firms can invest in R&D. They react strategically to the investment choices of the compe-
tition because, in a second stage, they compete in quantities in a vertically differentiated
duopoly.
Vertical innovation allows us to study incremental innovation in the form of quality
improvement (see Motta, 1993, Sutton, 1991, 1997). To make the analysis interesting we
assume that consumer utility is quadratic. Di Comite et al. (2014) show that quadratic
utilities gives a meaningful representation of vertical differentiation (i.e., different tastes
for quality) in international context, distinguishing it from different tastes for varieties.
Additional advantage of using quadratic utilities can be linked to the work of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008): these preferences deliver a linear demand function which allows for
variable (endogenous) mark-ups that are affected by the intensity of competition and are
thus well suited to study imperfect competition, as created by patents and IPR.
We show that when the South develops a relatively efficient R&D system, an asym-
metric protection regime (strong in the North and lax in the South) often increases global
innovation and welfare as compared to a universally strong protection of IPR. This re-
sult is consistent with Chen et al. (2014). These authors show that, when innovation
is “continual” (i.e. incremental), stronger IPR are not necessarily conducive of higher
innovation. In Chen et al. (2014) innovation necessarily builds on the previous one, so
that strong IPR oblige new innovators to share their profits with the first inventors who
hold patents on the technology they need. This reduces the incentives to innovate of
second generation innovators.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents the base model.
Section 4 derives the result on the impact of different IPR protection regimes on R&D
investment and discusses the robustness of the result to variations in the model. Section
5 studies countries’ incentive to enforce IPR protection. Section 6 concludes.
3 The base model
We consider a two-countries economy with a set S of innovative sectors. In each innovative
sector, s ∈ S, a national and a foreign firm produce a vertically differentiated good. The
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utility of a representative consumer in country j = 1, 2 consuming quantities qs1j and qs2j
of goods of qualities vs1j and vs2j, is quasi-linear:
Uj = wj +
∫
S
aj
(
vs1jqs1j + vs2jqs2j − (qs1j + qs2j)
2
2
)
ds (1)
where wj is the numeraire and aj is the weight put by the representative consumer on
the consumption of innovative products compared to more basic products such as food,
housing and energy. In practice this weight increase with individuals’ wealth.8 The
representative consumer in country j = 1, 2 has an income Rj and maximizes utility Uj
under the budget constraint:
Rj = wj +
∫
S
(ps1jqs1j + ps2jqs2j) ds.
We show in Appendix 7.1 that the inverse demand for good i = 1, 2 from sector s ∈ S in
country j = 1, 2 is:
psij = aj(vsi − bj(qs1j + qs2j)) (2)
where exogenous parameters aj > 0 and bj > 0 reflect per capita wealth and the inverse of
the population size respectively. Without loss of generality we assume that the advanced
economy is country 1 and the developing economy is country 2: a1 > a2. By contrast
there is no natural order for b1 and b2: the population size in country 1 might be smaller
or larger than in country 2. The parameter αj = aj/bj reflects the intensity of the demand
in country j (i.e, its GDP). A parameter which plays an important role in the analysis is
the ratio
γ =
α2
α1
> 0. (3)
The ratio γ captures the relative size/intensity of demand in country 2 with respect to
demand in country 1.9
Since the quasi-linear utility function (1) is additively separable in each of the S
components, the demand defined equation (2) for goods in sector s ∈ S is independent of
the demand from other sectors. We can therefore simplify the exposition by dropping the
index s in equation (2). In the following all our results are derived at the sector level. This
is done without any loss of generality. It is then easy to check that p1j−p2j = (v1− v2)aj
8The poor of the world allocate a larger share of their income to buy food, energy, housing and trans-
portation services than the rich, who consume more high-tech products and services, such as electronics,
pharmaceutical, healthcare, entertainment services. For instance food consumption absorbs close to 50%
of household spending in Cameroon, but less than 10% in the US.
9A small γ corresponds to a traditional North-South trade relationship, where the developing country
is poor such that its internal market is small compared to the internal market of the advanced economy.
A large γ corresponds to the new trade relationships as between fast-emerging countries such as China,
India or Brazil, with large internal market, and advanced economies.
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so that, unless goods 1 and 2 are identical in quality, they are not perfect substitutes. The
demand in each sector corresponds to a quality augmented version of the linear demand
model for differentiated goods proposed by Singh and Vives (1984).10
To study the impact of technological transfers on global R&D we focus on incremental
innovation: by investing ki
φ2i
2
a firm i = 1, 2 increases the quality of its good from vi = 1
to vi = 1 + φi.
11 As in Motta (1993) and Sutton (1991, 1997), this corresponds to a
quality-enhancing innovation which shifts the linear demand upwards (i.e., a new and
more effective drug, a new generation of mobile phones, etc.). The parameter ki > 0, is
an inverse measure of the efficiency of the R&D process in i = 1, 2. We assume that firm
1, based in country 1 (i.e., the advanced economy), has the most efficient R&D process.
∆ =
k2
k1
≥ 1 (4)
The ratio ∆ ≥ 1, which measures the technological gap between the two countries, plays
an important role in the analysis below. With γ > 0 defined above, these are the two
main comparative static parameters of the paper.
3.1 IPR regimes
The firms play a sequential game. In the first stage, they invest in R&D and choose to
copy their competitor innovation, or not. If imitation occurs it is perfect. Because of this
potential free-rider problem, the level of protection influences investment in R&D. We
distinguish three intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes, denoted r = F,N, P :
1. Full patent protection (F ): both countries protect patents and, after investment,
the quality of the good produced by firm i = 1, 2 is vFi = 1 + φi.
2. No protection (N): countries do not protect patents and, after investment, the
quality of the good produced by firm i = 1, 2 is vNi = 1 + φ1 + φ2.
3. Partial protection (P ): only country 1 protects innovation and, after investment,
the quality of the good produced by firm i = 1, 2 is vPi = 1 + φ1 + φ2.
If both countries enforce IPR (regime F ), imitation is not allowed and each firm
privately exploits its R&D output. If nobody protect IPR (regime N) imitation occurs in
10Quality augmented versions of the Singh and Vives (1984) model were initially introduced by Sutton
(1991, 1997) and later used by Symeonidis (2003). Symeonidis (2003) compares R&D investment in
Bertrand and Cournot competition in a model of horizontal differentiation with R&D spillovers. It
focuses on symmetric equilibria (i.e. firms have identical technologies and equal levels of innovation).
11Since our focus is on the incentive to invest in R&D, we make the assumption that innovation
is deterministic as it simplifies the exposition. If innovation was stochastic so that the probability of
improving the quality was increasing with the amount invested, the same qualitative results would hold.
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both countries. If country 1 protects IPR but not country 2 (regime P ), firm 2 produces
a commodity infringing upon firm 1 IPR. If it improves the good by investing in R&D,
firm 2 cannot claim protection for this marginal improvement. Firm 1 can reproduce
the incremental innovation developed by firm 2, if any, and imitation occurs in both
countries.12
3.2 Choice of quantities
In the second stage of the game, firms compete in quantities (Cournot game). Since
our focus is on the innovative activity of the firms, we do not detail how they organize
the physical location of production and shipment. This choice is a black-box and the
related production costs are normalized to zero.13 In country 2 firms are in a duopoly
configuration in all regimes. In country 1 there are also in a duopoly position in regimes
r = F,N . In regime P , firm 1 is in a monopoly position at home because firm 2 is unable
to export in country 1 when violating the patent rights of firm 1.
Firm i maximizes with respect to (qi1, qi2) its profit, Π
r
i = p
r
i1qi1 + p
r
i2qi2(−ki φ
2
i
2
) where
prij is the price defined in equation (2). The cost of R&D is in brackets because it has
been sunk in the first stage.
We deduce that the quantities produced at the second stage of the game are:
qrij =

vP1
2b1
if i = j = 1 and r = P ;
0 if i = 2 j = 1 and r = P ;
2vri−vr−i
3bj
otherwise.
(5)
4 Investment in R&D
As a benchmark case we first compute the optimal investment level from a global utili-
tarian point of view when the production levels are defined by (5). At the sector level,
the welfare of country j = 1, 2 is W rj = S
r
j + Π
r
j :
W rj = aj(v
r
1q
r
1j + v
r
2q
r
2j)− ajbj
(qr1j + q
r
2j)
2
2
− kj
φ2j
2
. (6)
12The assumption that firm 1 can copy the innovation of firm 2 under regime P is not essential to our
results. It is made for the sake of realism. Since firm 2 is infringing IPR of firm 1 to develop its product,
it cannot legally patent its own incremental innovation in country 1. However, if one assume that firm 2
can patent its marginal innovation φ2 in country 1, thus avoiding imitation from firm 1, the qualitative
results of the paper are preserved (computations are available from the authors upon request).
13Instead of setting marginal production costs to zero, we could define pi as the price net of marginal
cost of firm i. In this case, an increase in the intercept parameter ajvi, for the same level of income aj ,
could be both interpreted as an increase in quality vi or a decrease in the marginal production cost. This
alternative model gives similar qualitative results.
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The supranational planner aims to maximize W r1 + W
r
2 with respect to IPR regime and
R&D investment. Once the costs of R&D have been sunk, she has no reason to limit
innovation diffusion. At the optimum she chooses the no-protection regime N so that,
v∗j = v
N
j = 1 + φ1 + φ2 j = 1, 2. Substituting these values in (8) and (6), she maximizes
W ∗1 + W
∗
2 = W
N
1 + W
N
2 with respect to φj, for j = 1, 2. Let α = α1 + α2 be the depth
of the global market (i.e., the total GDP). At the optimum φ∗j =
α(1+∆)
9
8
∆k1−α(1+∆)
kj
(1+∆)k1
,
which is defined only if k1 >
8
9
1+∆
∆
α.14 A sufficient condition to obtain interior solutions
in all cases (i.e., for all ∆ ≥ 1) is that k1 is larger than 169 α. We thus make the following
assumption for ease of notation.
Assumption 1 k1 = 2α
This normalization is not crucial for our results.15 What matters is that ∆ = k2
k1
, the
technological gap between the two countries, varies. Under assumption 1 the optimal
level of investment, φ∗ = φ∗1 + φ
∗
2, is:
φ∗ =
4(∆ + 1)
5∆− 4 . (7)
The function φ∗ is decreasing and convex in ∆ ≥ 1. The international optimal investment
in R&D decreases with the technological gap between country 2 and 1, an intuitive result.
4.1 Comparison of investment levels
We next turn to the more realistic case where countries compete in R&D. At the second
stage, quantities are given by the levels in (5). At the first stage (investment stage), taking
the level of investment by its competitor φ−i, −i 6= i as given, firm i = 1, 2 maximizes,
its profit with respect to φi:
Πri = p
r
i1q
r
i1 + p
r
i2q
r
i2 − ki
φ2i
2
(8)
where prij is the function defined in equation (2) evaluated at the quantities defined in
(5) and quality vector (vr1, v
r
2) is given by v
P
i = v
N
i = 1 + φ1 + φ2 and v
F
i = 1 + φi.
Solving for the equilibrium (i.e., the intersection of the reaction functions), the total
level of innovation available to firm i = 1, 2 depends on IPR protection. Details of the
computations are given in Appendix 7.2.
14If k1 ≤ 89 1+∆∆ α the optimal level of investments are unbounded.
15Appendix ?? shows that for other values of k1 which are not too big, the investment levels and
welfare have the same shape as in the base case and only the value of some thresholds are modified. By
contrast, when k1 becomes very large the innovation levels decrease drastically under all regimes and
country 2’s incentive to imitate decreases accordingly.
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Full IPR protection: In regime F , firms cannot free-ride on each other so that φFi = φi.
Their investment in R&D are strategic substitute and at the equilibrium φFi =
3
k−i
α
−4
15∆−8 for
−i, i = 1, 2 and −i 6= i. Since by convention k2 = ∆k1 ≥ k1, the highest quality available
to consumers in F is φF = φF1 , which under assumption 1 is:
φF =
6∆− 4
15∆− 8 . (9)
No IPR protection: In regime N , the level of innovation embodied in good i is φN =
φN1 + φ
N
2 . Firms’ investment in R&D are strategic complement and φ
N
i =
k−i
8∆−1
1
2α
for
−i, i = 1, 2 and −i 6= i. We deduce that under assumption 1:
φN =
∆ + 1
8∆− 1 . (10)
Asymmetric IPR protection: In regime P , only country 1 protects IPR. If firm 2
chooses to imitate firm 1, firm 1 also imitates firm 2 so that the innovation embodied in
good i = 1, 2 is φP = φP1 + φ
P
2 . Firms’ investment in R&D are strategic complement and
in equilibrium total innovation is:
φP =
9∆ + 4γ(1 + ∆)
27∆ + 4γ(8∆− 1) . (11)
Comparing (7), (10), and (11) it is easy to check that φ∗ > φP > φN for all ∆ ≥ 1. The
aggregated investment level is higher under partial protection than under no protection
at all. This result gives credibility to the idea that stronger IPR protection is conducive
to more innovation at the global level. The next result shows the limit of this intuition.
Proposition 1 There is a threshold ∆(γ) ∈ (1, 4
3
) decreasing in γ ≥ 0 such that:
• If ∆ ≤ ∆(γ) then φN ≤ φF ≤ φP < φ∗
• If ∆ > ∆(γ) then φN ≤ φP < φF < φ∗.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
The result of Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The function φF defined in (9) is
increasing and concave in ∆ ≥ 1. This is because regime F prevents any R&D spillover,
so if firm 2 invests less in R&D it has no direct negative effect on the quality φF produced
by firm 1. It has just an indirect positive effect on innovation through better sales for
firm 1 as the competitive pressure between the two firms decreases when ∆ increases.
By contrast the function φN defined in (10) is decreasing and convex in ∆ ≥ 1. This
is because the two investment levels are strategic complement under N : If firm 2 invests
11
Figure 1: Investment levels
less because it is less efficient, firm 1 invests less too. It is interesting to note that φF and
φN are equal when ∆ = 1, they diverge when ∆ increases. The full protection regime is
not conducive of more innovation than the no protection regime when the technological
gap between the two firms is very small. It just leads to a duplication of R&D costs.
This is a case where an universal enforcement of IPR is inefficient.
When firm 2 chooses to free-ride on firm 1 innovation it cannot export the resulting
good in country 1. This restriction breaks the symmetry between the two markets. The
total investment level φP in (11) depends both on ∆, the technological gap between the
two firms, and on γ, the relative size of demand in country 2 compared to country 1. It
is decreasing and convex in γ and in ∆. When the technological gap between the two
countries increases the contribution to R&D by firm 2 decreases. Since this investment
boosts the investment by firm 1, a larger ∆ means a lower level of total innovation. Indeed
in the P regime, each firm imitates its rival’s innovation and improves upon it through
its own R&D activity as innovation is cumulative. More interestingly the total level of
innovation is also decreasing and convex in γ, which explains that the threshold value in
Proposition 1 ∆(γ) decreases with γ as illustrated Figure 1. Intuitively, when the relative
size of the southern market, γ, is small, the free-riding problem is less important. Firm
2 can only sell in country 2, a small market, and the investment in R&D is less harmed
by partial protection of IPR. On the contrary, if the developing country market is large,
free-riding by firm 2 has a strong effect on the total incentive to innovate. In other words,
when small poor countries free ride on investment by rich countries, they have a smaller
impact on the total incentives to innovate than when large poor countries free ride. In
the limit (i.e., when γ → +∞) the free-ridding problem is so large that the total level
of investment under the partial protection regime P converges towards the low level of
investment under the no protection regime N .
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4.2 Discussion
Proposition 1 shows that the levels of investments with either no protection or partial
protection of IPR are suboptimal compared with the optimal level (7). This is hardly
surprising. The incentives of the firms are wrong (i.e., they focus on profit) and the
free-rider problem takes its toll on R&D investment when their property rights are not
well enough protected. Similarly, the total investment level is always higher under a
partial protection regime than under no protection at all. One could argue that the
‘no protection’ regime is not relevant because rich countries do enforce IPR, so that, at
worst, partial protection holds. However, this is true only if illegal imports are banned.
With smuggling the equilibrium converges towards the no-protection regime. This bad
outcome helps to explain the lobbying by pharmaceutical companies and the music and
movie industries. And in fact drugs, films and disks can easily be copied, smuggled
or purchased over the Internet.16 More importantly, Proposition 1 shows that total
investment in R&D is often higher under regime P than under regime F . In other words,
it is not true that stronger protection of IPR always increases global investment. The
result depends on the capacity of each country to do R&D. Two cases are particularly
policy relevant.
First, the innovation activity of many developing countries is still negligible. Inno-
vative activities are concentrated in a handful of countries, with the top seven countries
accounting for 71 % of the total R&D worldwide expenses.17 When only the firms in
the advanced economy (by convention, country 1) invest in R&D, corresponding in our
model to ∆ → ∞, the second condition of Proposition 1 holds and market integration
without strong IPR yields a low level of investment compared to stronger IPR regimes.
By continuity market integration with full patent protection F guarantees the highest
level of innovation whenever the two countries have very unequal technological capacity.
Second, as emerging countries such as China or India have developed world-class level
R&D systems, we need to consider the case where country 2 has been able to decrease
its technological gap. When ∆ is small, global innovation is higher if country 2 does not
protect IPR (i.e., in the P regime). This result arises because the investment made by
the competition, which in the Nash equilibrium is perceived as exogenous, is a demand
booster which stimulates market growth when it can be copied (i.e., in regimes P and
16“U.S. Customs estimates 10 million U.S. citizens bring in medications at land borders each year. An
additional 2 million packages arrive annually by international mail from Thailand, India, South Africa
and other points. Still more packages come from online pharmacies in Canada.” “Millions of Americans
Look Outside U.S. for Drugs,” Flaherty and Gaul, Washington Post, Thursday, October 23, 2003.
17These countries are the US, China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and South Korea. See WIPO
Publication No. 941E/2011 ISBN 978-92-805-2152-8 at www.wipo.int
13
N). An increase of investment by firm in country 1 is hence matched by an increase
in investment by firm in country 2.18 Thanks to the appearance of new generations of
products and/or new applications (e.g., smart phones), the demand expands so that the
firms have more incentive to invest in quality development. Therefore the total level of
innovation is higher under a partial protection system P than under a full protection
system F . This equilibrium does not militate for universally strong protection of IPR.
4.3 Robustness
In this section we discuss the robustness of the result of Proposition 1 with regard to our
assumptions. Unless specified otherwise, the detail of the computations are omitted to
save space. They are available from the authors upon request.
In our base model the production and transportation choices are a black box, and the
related costs are normalized to zero in both countries. In Appendix 7.2 we assume that
selling in a foreign country implies a unit cost equal to t ≥ 0 (e.g., an export cost).19 We
show that the result of Proposition 1 still holds for values of t > 0 which are not too large
(for very large values of t there is no trade, so IPR regimes do not matter for investment
at the international level).
The assumption of cumulative innovation in case of imitation (regimes P and N),
vNi = v
P
i = 1 +φ1 +φ2, is realistic in many industries and is a good match to the process
of technological transfer at the heart of the TRIPS controversy. Nevertheless, in some
cases innovation is not cumulative. We have checked the alternative hypothesis that,
under imitation, the quality available is the best innovation of the two firms: vNi = v
P
i =
1 + max{φ1, φ2}. It turns out that this assumption is equivalent in our base model to
the limit case where ∆ → ∞. With non-cumulative innovation, Proposition 1 implies
that the F regime is conducive at the global level to more innovation than the P regime,
an intuitive result when only the maximum of the two investments matters. This is
consistent with results by Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004). In their
models innovation is not cumulative, so that an increase in the strength of protection
always increases innovation.
The possibility of illegal imports is explored by assuming that if firm 2 copies firm
18This strategic complementarity of R&D investment is vivid in the high-tech industry. For instance
James Allworth quotes an email from Apple executive Eddy Cue, advocating a change to Apple’s lineup
of tablet products as a result of him trying out a product that Samsung had released to market. (“Who
Cares If Samsung Copied Apple?” James Allworth, Harvard Business Review Blog August 20, 2012).
19In open economies firms can choose a variety of arrangements to minimize the sum of production and
transportation costs. In practice different levels of IPR protection also affect the choice among licensing,
FDI, and trade. However the existing empirical evidence is inconclusive on the impact of IPR on this
choice (see Fink and Maskus, 2005).
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1’s innovation, firm 2 can smuggle in country 1 an expected quantity of qf21 = (1− f)qo21,
where qo21 represents the Cournot quantity and f ∈ [0, 1] the quality of enforcement in
country 1. If f = 1, we are in the former regime P and firm 2 cannot export in 1. If
f = 0 there is no restriction to import of imitated goods in country 1, and we are in
regime N . Imperfect enforcement corresponds to an intermediate case between N and
P so that in equilibrium: φN ≤ φf ≤ φP for f ∈ [0, 1]. We deduce from Proposition 1
that illegal imports tend to reduce the incentive to innovate at the global level, which is
consistent with the result obtained in the literature on legal parallel imports (see Rey,
2003 and Valletti, 2006).20
The case of imperfect imitation is explored by assuming that vNi = v
P
i = 1+φi+gφ−i,
with 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. The base case model of perfect imitation is obtained for g = 1 so that,
when g is sufficiently close to 1, our results are preserved. More generally, for g > 1/2,
the firms’ investment levels are strategic complements and the reaction functions are
qualitatively similar to the ones in the base case. Our main results hold but the relevant
thresholds change: regimes (P ) and (N) are preferred more often from the total welfare
point of view. Indeed when imitation becomes imperfect the negative impact of free riding
on Northern imitation and welfare is reduced.21 This is in line with several empirical
studies which find that, when the developing country imitation capacity is lower, the
negative impact of weak IPR on imports is less pronounced or disappears (see Fink and
Maskus, 2005).
The choice of quantity competition allows us to study vertical differentiation without
incurring the Bertrand paradox. If instead we consider price competition, the firm with
the higher quality/price ratio captures all the market, so that there is never an equilib-
rium in which both firms produce and innovate. This is not realistic. Bertrand oligopoly
for roughly homogeneous products is hardly ever empirically observed, while Cournot
oligopoly has significant empirical relevance (see Brander and Spencer, 2015). To make
price competition relevant, it is necessary to add either horizontal differentiation and/or
consumer heterogeneity. In an extension we allow for horizontal differentiation between
the two firms products. This additional dimension of differentiation increases the com-
plexity of the analysis but it does not change the qualitative results of the paper.22 Our
20Illegal imports are different from parallel imports (or international exhaustion), which are legal. Yet
by reducing the possibility of performing price discrimination by Northern firms, parallel imports also
weaken their incentives to innovate (see Rey, 2003 and Valletti, 2006). This result is partially challenged
by Grossman and Edwin (2008) and Valletti and Szymanski (2006).
21However, because of trade effects (imitated goods cannot be exported in the North), the South
chooses also to imitate less often when imitation is imperfect (i.e. it is more willing to enforce IPR).
22Cournot firms invest generally more in R&D than Bertrand firms. The investment gap decreases
when horizontal differentiation increases, as differentiation lowers the impact of competition more in the
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core result does not depend on the particular form (i.e., price or quantity) competition
takes. It depends on the fact that innovation is incremental.
This section has shown that our base result is robust to different variations of the
model. Conditionally on the fact that the rich countries are able to protect enough
their domestic markets from the importation of IPR infringing products, an asymmetric
protection regime can increase the level of innovation at the world level. This result hinges
on the fact that innovation is cumulative so that imitation makes firms’ contribution
strategic complement. It does not hold with drastic innovations, and more generally with
non-cumulative (e.g., horizontal) ones. We now decompose the result of Proposition 1
at the industry and country level in order to get implications on the willingness of the
different actors to enforce IPR.
5 Choice of IPR protection
The result of Proposition 1 is based on a comparison of all hypothetical regimes. Yet
in practice advanced economies are already enforcing IPR, while developing/emerging
countries are not necessarily protecting them. There is a sound theoretical justification
for the rich country first mover behavior: it always wins to move from N to P , while this
is not true for the poor country (see Appendix 7.4.1). Starting from the premise that
country 1 (the advanced economy) has a strong IPR regime, the relevant policy question
is when country 2 (the developing country) will choose to enforce IPR as well. Taking
the IPR regime of country 1 as given, country 2 chooses the protection regime F or P
which yields the highest national welfare. We show the following result.
Proposition 2 There are two thresholds 0 < γ < γ such that:
• If 0 < γ < γ then W F2 > W P2 ;
• If γ ≤ γ ≤ γ then there exists a threshold value ∆2(γ) ≥ 1 such that W F2 ≥ W P2 if
and only if ∆ ≤ ∆2(γ);
• If γ > γ then W F2 < W P2 .
Moreover, γ < γ′, γ < γ′ and ∆2(γ) < ∆′2(γ).
case of price than in the case of quantity competition (Lin and Saggi, 2002 and Rosenkranz, 2003). It also
decreases when the investment made by one firm benefits the competition (Symeonidis, 2003). Although
Symeonidis (2003) considers cost-reducing and not quality-augmenting innovation, this spillover effect is
similar to what happens in our model when imitation occurs because both type of innovation increases
the net demand (i.e. innovation shifts the price-cost margin upwards).
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Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
Country 2 prefers strong protection of IPR when its domestic market is relatively
small (i.e., when γ is smaller than γ). In this case it is very important for firms in
country 2 to have access to the market of country 1. By contrast, when the size of its
national market is relatively large, country 2 can afford not to protect IPR (i.e., when
γ is larger than γ). For intermediate values of γ (γ ≤ γ ≤ γ) the result depends on ∆,
the efficiency of the R&D system. If the country is relatively efficient at R&D it will
prefer to enforce IPR so as to protect its own innovations. If it is relatively inefficient,
and therefore innovates little, it will prefer not to enforce IPR.
From an empirical point of view, we expect the strength of the effective protection of
IPR to be U-shaped in αi, the country market intensity (i.e., total GDP), and inversely
U-shaped in αj, the intensity of its export market. Poor countries with a small interior
market compared to their export opportunities should enforce IPR relatively strictly. At
the other end of the spectrum, advanced economies are also enforcing strictly IPR. In the
middle, we expect developing countries with large population, and hence large internal
market compared to their export opportunities, to free ride on rich countries’ innovations
by adopting a lax enforcement of IPR. This free-rider behavior should decrease with the
maturity of the country’s R&D system.
5.1 Sectorial versus global enforcement of IPR
So far we have focused on a specific sector s ∈ S. For the countries which do not have de-
veloped any real R&D capacity (i.e., so that ∆→ +∞), and which still represent the vast
majority of developing countries, the decision that is optimal for one sector is optimal for
all of them. More generally, for countries which have homogeneous R&D capacity across
sectors, Proposition 2 applies at the country level.23 Now there are some developing coun-
tries where sectors might significantly differ in their R&D performance. There are two
cases. First, if international agreements such as TRIPS impose uniform level of enforce-
ment of IPR, countries have to weight the possible welfare gains and losses of stronger IPR
enforcement in the different sectors in order to choose the regime that maximizes total wel-
fare. A benevolent social planner in country j maximizes the sum of welfare for all sectors
s ∈ S, such as: r∗j = argmaxr∈{P,F}
∫
S
[
aj(v
r
s1q
r
s1j + v
r
s2q
r
s2j)− ajbj
(qrs1j+q
r
s2j)
2
2
− ksj φ
2
sj
2
]
ds.
Second, if a country can choose differentiated IPR enforcement for each sector s ∈ S,
it will follow the result of Proposition 2 sector-wise. Firms in different sectors will behave
23Indeed at the macro level the demand for innovative products depends on macro parameter such as
gdp per capita and population size, while investment in R&D and innovative activities in sector s ∈ S
depend on ∆s. When ∆s = ∆, ∀s ∈ S, then the optimal decision is the same in all sectors.
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differently, some of them violating IPR of Northern firms while other respecting them to
be able to export. Indeed the result in Proposition 2 is the equilibrium if a lax enforcement
of IPR leads to global trade sanctions on certain sectors so that firms in these sectors that
would respect IPR would not be able to export anyway. If there is no global sanction, firm
2 might freely choose between becoming an imitator (and thus not exporting in country
1) or respecting patents to be able to export in country 1 (although the home country
does not impose it). When the regime chosen by country 2 is P , firm 2 imitates if and
only if ΠP2 ≥ ΠF2 . We show in Appendix 7.3.3 that the region in which firm 2 prefers to
respect IPR is larger than the region favored by the country 2, i.e. there exist a region
of the parameters for which ΠF2 > Π
P
2 while W
F
2 < W
P
2 . In this region, although country
2 does not protect IPR, firm 2 decides not to imitate, to be able to export in country 1.
Welfare under P is thus the same as under F in the sense that the country’s decision not
to enforce IPR does not affect the behavior of the firm. When anticipating this choice,
the country is indifferent between enforcing or not IPR in this region (there is now a
region of indifference in which the preference of country 2 for regime P becomes weak).
In practice it will choose P because this regime better accommodates sectors and firms
heterogeneity.24 The heterogeneity of firms across sectors s ∈ S militates for a sectorial
approach to IPR enforcement, rather than a global one, at the country level.
This result explains why fast-emerging countries, such as India or China, have been
reluctant to enforce IPR at the national level as their huge domestic markets developed.
For instance prior to 2005, Indian drug producers were allowed (and encouraged) to copy
patented medicines of foreign firms to create generic by means of reverse engineering.
This measure was introduced in the seventies by the government of India to promote the
growth of the domestic market and to produce affordable medicines for the population,
which was unable to buy foreign drugs. This deliberate policy of piracy has boosted the
Indian pharmaceutical sector, making it able to address local market needs with surpluses
that have facilitated exports in direction of other developing countries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The share of pharmaceutical in national exports has hence steadily
increased from 0.55 per cent in 1970-71 to over 4 per cent by 1999/2000 (see Kumar,
2002), to reach 5 percent today. This sector specific policy of IPR infringement did
prevent India from exporting its cheap medicines in rich countries but it did not prevent
India from exporting textiles and other commodities.
24For instance less than a third (26.3% according to Wakasugi and Zhang, 2012 and 30.2% according
to Lu et al., 2010) of Chinese manufacturing firms export something, with considerable heterogeneity
between domestic firms (only 15.7%-20% are exporting) and foreign-owned ones (60.8%-64.1% are ex-
porters). The exporters respect IPR to be able to sell their production, while the firms which produces
only for the Chinese market, are happily stealing technology from the North.
18
5.2 International conflicts over IPR protection
For country 1, it is not clear that the choice of not protecting IPR in country 2 is
necessarily bad. In regime P , when country 2 chooses to steal innovations developed in
country 1, this reduces competition in country 1. Moreover incremental innovations made
by firm 2 increase the stock of innovation offered by firm 1, in turn increasing the demand
for its products and thus its profit. The next result establishes that the position of the
advanced economy vis a` vis IPR adoption by its trade partner is indeed ambiguous.
Proposition 3 There is a threshold γ1 > 0 such that:
• If γ < γ1 then W P1 > W F1 ;
• If γ ≥ γ1 then there exists a threshold value ∆1(γ) increasing in γ such that W F1 ≥
W P1 if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆1(γ).
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Propositions 2 and 3 by representing the welfare
gains/losses obtained by country j = 1, 2 when the regime shifts from P to F (i.e., the
sign of W Fj −W Pj ). There is no conflict between the two countries in the white region
only. This result helps to explain why it is so hard to find a consensus on agreements such
as TRIPS. The interests of developing countries and of advanced economies are generally
antagonistic.
Contrary to the developing country, country 1 prefers regime P whenever γ or ∆
are small enough. It prefers full protection F otherwise (see Appendix 7.6 for details).
For intermediate values of γ, when country 2 is very inefficient (∆ large), it chooses not
to protect IPR and to free ride on country 1’s innovations by choosing regime P , while
country 1 would prefer F . However, as ∆ decreases the developing country switches to
F , while country 1 would prefer to protect its interior market from imports with P .
Concretely, an emerging country incentives to enforce IPR more strictly will rise as
it moves from zero to substantial investment levels in R&D. This dynamic is illustrated
by the Indian pharmaceutical industry. For decades, India has produced drugs without
respecting IPR, initially to serve its huge interior market, and later to serve also other
developing countries. This led Western pharmaceutical companies to lobby for a strict
enforcement of IPR at the world level and, eventually, to the TRIPS agreement, which
was itself challenged by many countries and later amended on the ground that IPR should
not prevent a country from fighting epidemics. However, now that India has developed
a full-fledged pharmaceutical industry and built strong R&D capacity, it has changed its
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Figure 2: Sign of welfare difference between regimes F and P . In the dark shaded region
W F2 −W P2 ≥ 0 and in the light shaded region W F1 −W P1 ≥ 0.
legislation. As a result of the 2005 patent legislation, Indian drug firms can no longer
copy medicines with foreign patents.
5.3 IPR and innovation in poor countries
To assess the impact of IPR protection on innovative activities in the South and in the
North the result of Proposition 1 is decomposed at the country level. In the base model it
is assumed that before investment the two firms can produce the same quality, normalized
to 1. However, in real-world situations, the quality of the commodities produced by the
two firms differ ex-ante (i.e., before investment). Appendix 7.5 proposes an extension of
the model where, before investment, the quality of firm 1 is v1 = 1 and the quality of
firm 2 is v2 = 1− d, with d ∈ [0, 1] representing the quality gap between the two goods.
If imitation occurs, this gap can be closed and everything is as in the base case. The
difference between the two models is thus under regime F , where the quality of firm 2
after innovation is vF2 = 1− d+ φF2 , while the quality of firm 1 is vF1 = 1 + φF1 .
Proposition 4 Let φFid be the level of investment by firm i = 1, 2 when d ∈ [0, 1]. We
have that φF2d ≤ φP ∀d ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, there exist d˜ < dˆ ≤ 14 such that
• φF1d ≥ φP1 ⇔ d ≥ d˜
• φF2d ≤ φP2 ⇔ d ≥ dˆ
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Proof. For proof, see Appendix 7.5.
In the Appendix we show that when either γ ≥ 1/3 or ∆ ≥ 4/3, d˜ is strictly negative,
which implies that the first condition of Proposition 4 always holds and φFd1 is always larger
than φP1 . Since most developing countries are either doing no R&D (i.e., ∆ → +∞) or,
when they are doing substantial R&D such as India or China, they have a very large
internal market (i.e., γ is large), we predict an increase in innovation activities of the
firm in the advanced economy when IPR are better enforced in the developing country.
Proposition 4 also implies that the impact of enforcing IPR more strictly tends to have the
opposite effect on innovation activities in the developing economy . Indeed, the impact of
a stricter policy is the same only when d ∈ (d˜, dˆ), which is a narrow range (i.e., dˆ ≤ 0.25).
We hence predict that when IPR are better enforced in a developing country, innovation
by local firms should decrease.
The impact of universal IPR on global innovation and on the ability of the South
to develop high-tech industries and autonomous research capacity is at the heart of the
TRIPS controversy (see Sachs, 2003). The empirical literature on the effects of TRIPS has
until recently focused on the pharmaceutical industry. This empirical literature confirms
that strict IPR enforcement tend to have an adverse effect on domestic innovation in
developing countries, although they can stimulate research in countries with higher levels
of economic development (see Chaudhuri et al., 2006, Qian, 2007, Kyle and McGahan,
2012, Williams, 2013). More recently, Auriol et al. (2017) have studied the impact of
stronger IPR protection on innovation in a broader set of manufacturing sectors. The
paper shows that increasing IPR strength decreases on-the-frontier innovation of resident
firms in developing countries (resident patents) but increases innovation of nonresident
firms (which are mostly based in developed countries). The total number of patents in the
countries which enforce IPR more strictly is not affected: there is simply a substitution
between domestic and foreign ones. This empirical finding contradicts again the idea that
stronger protection of IPR in developing countries will lead to more patents at the global
level.
6 Conclusion
The paper contributes to the understanding of the forces that encourage innovation at the
global level, focusing on two issues: first, the incentives that developing countries have
to protect IPR; second, the impact of their choices on global innovation. Developing
countries face a trade-off between the benefit of free-riding on the advanced economies
innovations to serve their internal demand and the cost it yields in term of reduced export
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opportunities. If the domestic market is large compared to the export market, the benefit
outweighs the cost, and conversely if the internal market is relatively small. Since rich
countries have an incentive to protect IRP because they are big innovators, the strength
of a country’s patents protection is a U-shaped function of the relative size of its domestic
market with respect to its export opportunities.
By focusing on incremental innovation (quality enhancing) our results complement
the trade literature, focused on monopolistic competition with horizontal innovation (a
new variety). It yields useful insights on the desirability of enforcing uniformly strong
IPR protection. The IPR regime maximizing global innovation depends both on the ma-
turity of the R&D system and on the size of the developing country’s internal market.
The global level of investment in R&D is higher under a full protection regime of IPR
when developing countries are pure free-riders and do not innovate on their own or when
innovation is not cumulative (e.g., horizontal innovation). However, with the emergence
of new players in the R&D world system, such as China and India, an asymmetric en-
forcement of IPR, weak in the South and strong in the North, often implies an higher level
of investment in R&D. Indeed strict IPR protection reduces the ability of countries to
close their technological gap by means of copying and reverse engineering, and therefore
to become innovators. With asymmetric protection, investments in R&D of Northern
and Southern firms are strategic complement so that investments by firms in the North
are matched by investment by firms in the South. Total investment is then larger than
with universally strong protection and no technological diffusion.
A limitation of our results is that they are derived from a partial equilibrium analysis.
General equilibrium effect could have some impact on our results, for instance through
a modification of the wages in the South, if the IPR policy could affect the capability of
firms to produce innovative goods and the size of Southern firms. This general equilibrium
issues are discussed in Branstetter and Saggi (2011), who note however that the effect
on wages might not be large in practice, as IPR reforms do not affect all goods produced
in the economy but only a handful of innovative sectors. When the innovative sector is
small compared to the rest of the economy, which is the case in most countries, especially
developing ones, partial equilibrium analysis might not be very restrictive. Anyhow, we
believe that an extension to a general equilibrium framework could be an interesting
development for further research.
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7 Appendix:
7.1 The demand function
Substituting wj = Rj−
∫
S
(ps1jxs1j +ps2jxs2j)ds in (1) and optimizing with respect to xsij
yields:
∂Uj
∂xsij
= −psij + ajvsij − aj(xs1j + xs2j) (i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, s ∈ S). If ajvsij − psij >
ajvsj −i − psj −i then xsj −i = 0 and xsij = vsij − psij/aj. If ajvsij − psij = ajvsj −i − psj −i
the representative consumer demand is xs1j + xs2j = vsij − psij/aj. Let Nj be the size of
the population in country j = 1, 2, the total demand in country j = 1, 2 in sector s ∈ S is
qs1j + qs2j = Nj(vsij − psij/aj). Letting bj ≡ 1Nj , the aggregated inverse demand for good
i = 1, 2 in sector k ∈ K in country j = 1, 2 is psij = aj(vsij − bj(qs1j + qs2j)). It increases
with the gdp per capita (i.e., it increases with aj)
25 and with the population size (i.e., it
decreases with bj = 1/Nj) in country j = 1, 2.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We derive the result under the general case where exporting to a foreign country implies
a unit transportation cost equal to t ≥ 0. The results of the base model are simply
obtained by fixing t = 0. The total profit of firm i is written as:
ΠDi = pi1qi1 + pi2qi2 − tqij − ki
φ2i
2
(12)
At the second stage, the Cournot quantity produced by firm i in country j becomes:
qDij =
2vri − vr−i
3bj
+
2t
3aibj
, i,−i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= −i (13)
where the index −i represents the competitor and the value of vri depends on the IPR
regime r ∈ {F,N, P}, i.e., vri ∈ {vFi , vNi , vPi }.
• The socially optimal level of investment : Optimizing W = W r1 +W r2 with the profit
function being replaced by (12) and the quantity formula by (13), the socially
optimal level of innovation in country j = 1, 2 becomes:
φ∗j =
α− t b1+b2
2b1b2
9
8
k1k2
k1+k2
− α
kj
k1 + k2
(14)
Recall that ∆ = k2
k1
and that under assumption 1 k1 = 2α = 2(α1 + α2). Then the
optimal level of innovation in the common market, φ∗ = φ∗1 + φ
∗
2, is:
φ∗ =
4(∆ + 1)
5∆− 4 −
t
αb1b2
2(∆ + 1)
5∆− 4 (15)
25In our stylized model wj is the consumption of the numeraire and an increase in a shifts the demand
up for the vertically differentiated varieties. Alternatively 1/a can be interpreted as the marginal utility
of income, which typically decreases with per capita income.
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For t = 0, this corresponds to equation (7). For t > 0, the symmetry between the
two countries is broken: a decrease in transportation costs always increases invest-
ment, and this effect is larger when the population of the two countries increases.
The higher the population size 1/bj (j = 1, 2), the higher the investment.
• Full IPR protection (F regime): Substituting the quantities (13) in the profit func-
tion, firm i maximizes (12) with respect to φi, for a given level of φ−i, i 6= −i. Profit
maximization gives the reaction function:
φi(φ−i) =
α(1− φ−i)− 2bi−b−ibib−i t
2.25ki − 2α (16)
The slope of the reaction function is negative: ∂φi(φ−i)
∂φ−i
< 0. Quality levels (and
thus investment levels) are strategic substitutes. Solving the system of first-order
conditions, we obtain:
φFi =
1
2
α(1− α
3k−i
) k−i
k1+k2
− t
k1+k2
(k−i( 2b−i − 1b−i )− 4α3b−i )
9
8
k1k2
k1+k2
− α(1− α
3
k1+k2
2
)
(17)
The level of quality chosen by firm i depends negatively on ki and positively on
k−i. Moreover φFi decreases with t if and only if
b−i
bi
≤ 2 − 4
3
α
k−i
. This inequality
is easier to satisfy when k−i increases. Let ∆ = k2k1 . Under assumption 1, the two
equilibrium investment levels can be written as:
φF1 =
6∆− 4
15∆− 8 −
t
α
6( 2
b2
− 1
b1
)∆− 4
b2
15∆− 8 (18)
φF2 =
5
15∆− 8 −
t
α
( 4
3b1
− 1
b2
)
15∆− 8 (19)
Setting t = 0 we find that the highest quality available to consumers is φF =
max{φF1 , φF2 } = φF1 , which yields equation (9). When t > 0, a decrease of the
transportation cost increases the level of investment of country 1 (resp. 2) if and
only if country 2 (resp. 1) is relatively large in terms of population.26
• No IPR protection (N regime): When IPR are not protected, the quality of good
i after investment is given by φN = φN1 + φ
N
2 . At the second stage, quantities are
26Interestingly, the same effect does not occur when per capita revenue increases. Starting from a
symmetric situation (a1 = a2), if the revenue of a country increases, both firms invest more, but the
investment levels remain symmetrical. This can explain why larger countries tend to invest more in
R&D, independently of income levels. For instance, countries like China and India invest more than
smaller countries with similar per capita income characteristics.
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given by the Cournot levels in (5). At the first stage, profit maximization gives the
reaction functions:
φi(φ−i) =
α(1 + φ−i)− 2bi−b−ibib−i t
4.5ki − α (20)
In this case the slope of the reaction function is positive: ∂φi(φ−i)
∂φ−i
> 0. Quality
levels (and thus investment) are strategic complements. The role played by the
transportation cost is equivalent to that in the F case. When the transportation
cost is positive, countries with a larger population tend to invest more than smaller
ones. We have:
φNi =
α k−i
k1+k2
− t
k1+k2
(k−i( 2b−i − 1bi )− 23α( 1b−i − 1bi ))
4.5 k1k2
k1+k2
− α (21)
As before, investment in country i increases with k−i and decreases with ki. More-
over, φNi decreases with t if and only if
b−i
bi
≤ 2(3k−i−α)
3k−i−2α . This inequality is easier
to satisfy when k−i decreases. Moreover, a decrease of the transportation cost in-
creases the level of investment of country i if and only if country −i’s population is
relatively large. Under assumption 1, the total quality under N can be written as:
φN = φN1 + φ
N
2 =
∆ + 1
8∆− 1 −
t
α
(( 1
b2
− 2
b1
) + ( 1
b1
− 2
b2
)∆)
8∆− 1 . (22)
For t = 0, this corresponds to equation (10). For t > 0, a decrease of the trans-
portation cost increases the total level of investment if and only if the two countries
have sufficiently different sizes.
Contrary to case F , a decrease of transportation cost is not always conducive to
more investment in R&D. The net effect depends on the relative size of the two
markets and on the technological gap between the two countries. The larger is ∆,
the competitive advantage of firm 1 in terms of R&D technology, the less likely it
is that a reduction in transportation costs increases the global investment in R&D.
• IPR protection only in one country (P regime): When only one country protects
IPR, the quality of good i after investment is given by φP = φP1 + φ
P
2 . At the first
stage, profit maximization gives the reaction functions:
φ1(φ2) =
(1 + φ2)(2.25α1 + α2)− 2tb2
4.5k1 − (2.25α1 + α2) (23)
φ2(φ1) =
(1 + φ1)α2 +
t
b2
4.5k2 − α2 (24)
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In the case of partial protection of IPR, investments are strategic complements.
Solving for the equilibrium we have:
φP1 =
(2.25α1 + α2)k2 − tb2 (2k2 − 12α1 − 23α2)
4.5k1k2 − (2.25α1 + α2)k2 − α2k1 (25)
φP2 =
α2k1 +
t
b2
(k1 − 12α1 − 23α2)
4.5k1k2 − (2.25α1 + α2)k2 − α2k1 (26)
Let γ = α2
α1
and ∆ = k2
k1
. Under assumption 1, the total level of investment under
regime P , φP = φP1 + φ
P
2 , is:
φP =
9∆ + 4γ(∆ + 1)
27∆ + 4γ(8∆− 1) −
t
b2α1
8(∆− 1)
27∆ + 4γ(8∆− 1) (27)
For t = 0, this corresponds to equation (11). For t > 0, a decrease in the trans-
portation cost increases the level of investment, and this effect is more important
when the size of population in country 2 increases (i.e., b2 is small). In fact, the
only possible trade in this case goes from country 1 to country 2.
• Comparison of the IPR regimes: Using (15), (22), and (27) it is easy to check that
φ∗ > φP ≥ φN . A more challenging issue is to compare φF with φP .
Proof of Proposition 1: Let t = 0. In this case, one can check that the difference
φF − φP is increasing in ∆:
∂(φF − φP )
∂∆
= 12
(
12γ(γ + 1)
(27∆ + 4γ(8∆− 1))2 +
1
(15∆− 8)2
)
≥ 0 (28)
Moreover, at the lowest admissible value (i.e., ∆ → 1) the difference is negative,
while it is positive for the very high value (i.e., ∆→∞).
(φF − φP )|∆→1 = −
9
7(28γ + 27)
< 0
(φF − φP )|∆→∞ =
44γ + 9
160γ + 135
> 0
We deduce that there exists a positive threshold
∆(γ) =
2
(
15γ +
√
γ(49γ + 54) + 9 + 3
)
44γ + 9
∈ [1, 4/3]
such that φF − φP ≥ 0 if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆(γ). This threshold is decreasing in γ
for all positive values of γ and varies between 1 and 4/3. We deduce the result in
Proposition 1. QED
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Now consider t > 0. Using equations (15),(18), (19), (22) and (27) it is easy to see
that the innovation levels keep the same shape as for t = 0. Using (18) and (27)
one can check that when b2
b1
≤ 2(γ(6∆+1)(11∆−4)+∆(51∆+4)−8)
3∆(4γ(8∆−1)+27∆) , the difference φ
F −φP is
increasing in t (which means that, for higher values of t, there exist more admissible
values of ∆ for which φP ≥ φF with respect to the base case). On the contrary,
when b2
b1
> 2(γ(6∆+1)(11∆−4)+∆(51∆+4)−8)
3∆(4γ(8∆−1)+27∆) , the opposite holds (which means that, for
higher t, there exist more admissible values of ∆ for which φF ≥ φP with respect
to the base case).
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
7.3.1 Social welfare functions with different IPR regimes
The net consumer surplus in country j = 1, 2 is:
Srj = aj(v1q
r
1j + v2q
r
2j)− ajbj
(qr1j + q
r
2j)
2
2
− pr1jqr1j − pr2jqr2j (29)
Adding the national consumer’s surplus to the national firm profit, we obtain the utili-
tarian welfare in country j = 1, 2. Under full protection of IPR (F ), it is:
W Fj =
1
18
[
3αj
(
2(1 + φFj )
2 + (φFj − φF−j)2
)
+ 2α−j(1 + 2φFj − φF−j)2
]
− kj
(φFj )
2
2
(30)
Similarly under no protection of IPR (N), welfare in country j = 1, 2 is:
WNj =
1
9
(3αj + α−j)(1 + φN1 + φ
N
2 )
2 − kj
(φNj )
2
2
(31)
Under partial protection (P ) welfare in country 1 and 2 are asymmetric. In country 2 it
is:
W P2 =
1
3
α2(1 + φ
P
1 + φ
P
2 )
2 − k2 (φ
P
2 )
2
2
(32)
In country 1 it is:
W P1 =
1
72
(27α1 + 8α2)(1 + φ
P
1 + φ
P
2 )
2 − k1 (φ
P
1 )
2
2
(33)
7.3.2 Optimal choice of IPR regime for country 2
We derive the optimal policy regarding IPR enforcement from the country 2 point of
view. Substituting the investment equilibrium value, (18) and (19) where t = 0, in (30)
welfare in 2 under full protection of IPR can be written as:
W F2 =
α(γ(∆(81∆− 76) + 18) + ∆(9∆− 4))
(γ + 1)(8− 15∆)2 (34)
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Setting t = 0 in (25) and (26), the investment equilibrium levels are φP1 =
(9+4γ)∆
27∆+4γ(8∆−1)
and φP2 =
4γ
27∆+4γ(8∆−1) . Substituting these values in (32) yields:
W P2 =
16αγ∆(27(γ + 1)∆− γ)
(4γ(8∆− 1) + 27∆)2 (35)
Using (34) and (35), we can write the welfare difference W F2 −W P2 as:
W F2 −W P2 = α
(−16∆γ(27∆(1 + γ)− γ)
(∆(27 + 32γ)− 4γ)2 +
∆(9∆(1 + 9γ)− 76γ − 4) + 18γ
(15∆− 8)2(1 + γ)
)
(36)
It is straightforward to check that:
(W F2 −W P2 )|∆→1 = α
3645− 3γ(56γ(14γ + 17)− 1053)
49(γ + 1)(28γ + 27)2
(W F2 −W P2 )|∆→∞ = α
(729− γ(16γ(99γ + 314) + 2511)
25(γ + 1)(32γ + 27)2
At the lowest admissible value ∆→ 1, the difference W F2 −W P2 is positive if and only if
γ ≤ γ = 1.14. At the other extreme, when ∆→∞, the difference W F2 −W P2 is positive
if and only if γ ≤ γ = 0.2. Moreover, one can check that
∂(W F2 −W P2 )
∂∆
= −α
(
12∆(13γ + 7)− 32− 68γ
(15∆− 8)3(1 + γ) −
16γ2(∆(189 + 184γ)− 4γ)
(∆(27 + 32γ)− 4γ)3
)
(37)
The difference W F2 −W P2 is decreasing in ∆ for sufficiently small γ. In particular, it is
decreasing for γ ≤ γ (sufficient condition). We deduce the result of Proposition 2.
7.3.3 Firm 2 choice between F and P
We compare profits under the regime P and F . The following result holds.
Lemma 1 There are two thresholds 0 < γ′ < γ′ such that:
• If 0 < γ < γ′ then ΠF2 > ΠP2 ;
• If γ′ ≤ γ ≤ γ′ then there exists a threshold value ∆′2(γ) ≥ 1 such that ΠF2 ≥ ΠP2 if
and only if ∆ ≤ ∆′2(γ);
• If γ > γ′ then ΠF2 < ΠP2 .
Proof. The profits of firm 2 can be written:
ΠF2 =
α∆(9∆− 4)
(15∆− 8)2 (38)
ΠP2 =
α16γ∆(9(1 + γ)∆− γ)
(27∆ + 4γ(8∆− 1))2 (39)
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Comparing equation (38) with (39), it is easy to verify that:
∂(ΠF2 − ΠP2 )
∂∆
=
4
5
α
(
−5(21∆− 8)
(15∆− 8)3 +
20γ2(5(8γ + 9)∆− 4γ)
(27∆ + 4γ(8∆− 1))3
)
≤ 0
(ΠF2 − ΠP2 )|∆→1 = −α
3 (784γ2 − 168γ − 1215)
49(28γ + 27)2
(ΠF2 − ΠP2 )|∆→∞ = −α
2576γ2 + 1872γ − 729
25(32γ + 27)2
Term ΠF2 − ΠP2 is decreasing in ∆. Moreover, at the lowest admissible value ∆→ 1, the
difference is positive if and only if γ ≥ γ′ ' 0.28. At the other extreme ∆ → ∞, the
difference is positive if and only if γ ≥ γ′ ' 1.36. We deduce the result.
Comparing the different thresholds, it is easy to check that γ in Proposition 2 is lower
than γ′ in Lemma 1 and γ is lower than γ′. Moreover, ∆2(γ) is smaller than ∆′2(γ). This
implies that the region in which country 2 prefers IPR to be respected is smaller than
the one in which firm 2 prefers not to imitate. The region defined by Proposition 2 is
dark-shaded in Figure 2. The region defined by Lemma 1 has the same shape, but it is
larger (i.e., it is shifted to the north-est).
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Under full protection of IPR (F ),
welfare in country 1 is defined as in (30), and under no protection (N) it is defined as in
(31), while under partial protection (P ) it is defined in (33). Substituting the investment
equilibrium value, under assumption 1, welfare under full protection of IPR (F ) can be
rewritten as:
W F1 =
α (5γ(2− 3∆)2 + 3∆(39∆− 44) + 38)
(γ + 1)(8− 15∆)2 (40)
Under partial protection (P ) it is:
W P1 =
α(2γ(64γ + 279) + 405)∆2
(4γ(8∆− 1) + 27∆)2 (41)
Finally, under no protection (N) it is:
WN1 =
2α(4γ + 13)∆2
(γ + 1)(1− 8∆)2 (42)
Comparing equation (40) with (41) one can check that:
(W F1 −W P1 )|∆→1 = −
6α(γ(7γ(56γ + 191) + 1461) + 513)
49(γ + 1)(28γ + 27)2
< 0
(W F1 −W P1 )|∆→∞ =
α(2γ(γ(960γ + 2401) + 1017)− 648)
25(γ + 1)(32γ + 27)2
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∂(W F1 −W P1 )
∂∆
=
4α
5(γ + 1)
(
5γ
(
2(γ+1)(2γ(64γ+279)+405)∆
(4γ(8∆−1)+27∆)3 +
15(3∆−2)
(15∆−8)3
)
+ 15(9∆−7)
(15∆−8)3
)
≥ 0 (43)
The difference W F1 −W P1 is increasing in ∆. At the lowest admissible value ∆→ 1, the
difference is negative. At the other extreme ∆→∞, W F1 −W P1 is positive if and only if
γ > 0.21 = γ1. Then,
• For γ ≤ γ1 W F1 −W P1 is always negative.
• For γ > γ1, W F1 −W P1 is negative when ∆ → 1 and positive when ∆ → ∞. Since
W F1 −W P1 is increasing, there is a threshold value ∆1(γ) such that W F1 ≥ W P1 if
and only if ∆ ≥ ∆1(γ).
7.4.1 Country 1 choice between P and N
We start from a situation where country 1 always enforces IPR because advanced economies
have been the first to adopt strong IPR legislations. This first mover behavior can easily
be generated in our model. Starting from a situation where initially IPR are not protected
(i.e., regime N), country 1 chooses to move to regime P to protect them domestically.
To see this, we use equations (40) and (42) to compute the welfare difference:
W P1 −WN1 = α∆2
(
405 + 2γ(279 + 64γ)
(∆(27 + 32γ)− 4γ)2 −
2(13 + 4γ)
(8∆− 1)2(1 + γ)
)
(44)
This welfare difference W P1 −WN1 is always positive for ∆ ≥ 1 and γ ≥ 0, which means
that country 1 gets a positive gain from starting to enforce IPR when country 2 does
not. Moreover the welfare gains are increasing in ∆ (i.e.
∂(WP1 −WN1 )
∂∆
≥ 0), which means
that the higher the technological gap between country 1 and 2, the higher the gains
form unilateral protection. This explains why advanced economies have been the first to
enforce IPR. By contrast we can show (computations available from the authors upon
request) that this result does not hold for country 2. Starting from N it is not necessarily
welfare improving for country 2 to start protecting its IPR while country 1 does not.27
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We assume that before investment the quality of firm 1 is v1 = 1 and the quality of firm
2 is v2 = 1 − d. Under regime P , this gap is closed by imitation and everything is as in
the base case. Under regime F , the quality of firm 1 after innovation will be vF1 = 1 +φ
F
1
27To prove this, we compare regime N with a modification of regime P in which the roles of country
1 and 2 are reversed. In this new regime when imitation takes place the most efficient, firm 1, is not
allowed to sell in country 2.
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and the quality of firm 2 vF1 = 1− d+ φF2 . Solving for the optimal level of investment we
obtain that the level of investment of firm 2 is:
φF2d = max
{ 2− 8d
15∆− 8 , 0
}
(45)
and firm 1’s investment is:
φF1d =
6(1+d)∆−4
15∆−8 if φ
F
2d > 0; (46)
φF1d =
2
5
(1 + d) otherwise. (47)
As intuition suggests, φF1d increases and φ
F
2d decreases in d. Comparing equation (45) with
(26) it is straightforward to verify that, for d ≥ dˆ = 27∆+2(6+∆)γ
27∆+4(32∆−4)γ , φ
F
d2 is smaller than
φP2 . Similarly, comparing equation (46) with (25) (for t = 0) it can be verified that, for
d ≥ d˜ = 3∆(12+40γ−∆(44γ+9))−16γ
6∆(∆(32γ+27)−4γ) , φ
F
d1 is larger than φ
P
1 .
We note that for γ ≥ 0.32, d˜ is negative for all ∆ ≥ 1 and so φFd1 is always larger than
φP1 . For smaller values of γ, d˜ can be positive if ∆ ≤ 2(9+30γ+
√
81+12γ(36+31γ))
3(9+44γ)
≤ 4
3
, and it
is negative otherwise. Then, γ ≥ 1/3 or ∆ ≥ 4/3 are sufficient conditions for φFd1 always
to be larger than φP1 . Moreover, one can also show that W
F
1 is increasing in d while W
F
2
is decreasing in d: when the developing country has an initial disadvantage, it is more
likely to prefer not to enforce IPR.
7.6 Global welfare analysis
We conclude the theoretical analysis by a brief presentation of the optimal policy from a
collective utilitarian point of view. It turns out that W F1 + W
F
2 , the total welfare under
regime F , does not behave smoothly. For this reason, comparison with regime P is not
straightforward.
Figure 3 illustrates the non-monotonicity of total welfare with respect to γ for high
values of ∆ (i.e., for high levels of ∆, F is socially preferable than P if γ is either very
small or very large). When γ is small, country 2 prefers F and country 1 prefers P but
the losses of country 1 are smaller than the gains of 2 and F is preferred from a global
point of view. In this case the choice of IPR protection by 2 is efficient. On the contrary,
when γ is very large (i.e., country 2 is very large or becomes richer), country 1 prefers
F and country 2 prefers P , while the losses of country 1 are larger than the gains of
country 2. Then F should be preferred at the global level, but country 2 has no incentive
to enforce IPR. These results hold true especially when country 2 does not do any R&D
at all (∆→∞).
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Figure 3: Total welfare difference: (W F1 + W
F
2 ) − (W P1 + W P2 ). In the colored region
(W F1 +W
F
2 )− (W P1 +W P2 ) > 0.
By contrast when country 2 has developed an efficient R&D system (i.e., when ∆ is
small), welfare is higher under a partial system P than under a full system F , unless γ
is very small.
35
